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Abstract
Price dynamics is analyzed in terms of a model which includes the possibility of effective forces
due to trend followers or trend adverse strategies. The method is tested on the data of a minority-
majority model and indeed it is capable of reconstructing the prevailing traders’ strategies in a
given time interval. Then we also analyze real (NYSE) stock-prices dynamics and it is possible to
derive an indication for the the “sentiment” of the market for time intervals of at least one day.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The simplest representation of price dynamics is usually considered as a simple Random
Walk (RW). It is easy to realize, however, that many important deviations ara also present.
The most studied are the problem of the “fat tails” (in the distribution of price returns),
the volatility clustering and various other elements related to the non stationarity of the
process [1, 2]. The arbitrage condition implies that no simple correlations can be present.
A large effort is therefore devoted to the identification of complex correlations of various
types. These correlations arise from the collective behavior of traders, which lastly, define
the price.
In this perspective a simple classification of trading strategies can be made in terms of
trend followers or trend adverse. Usually these different strategies are taken as input in
models which represent the behavior of traders.
Here we would like to consider the complementary point of view. Namely, given a time
series, is it possible to identify, from the data, the strategies of the traders? In order to
address this question we use a new approach which is based on a RW plus a force which
depends on the distance of the price from some suitable moving average [3, 4]. This idea is
that, with such an analysis, one can identify the “sentiment” of the market in a given time
interval.
In this paper, we first perform some statistical tests of the method to clear its signal
to noise ratio. Then we apply the method to time series generated by a minority-majority
model [5]. This is an important test because, in this case, one knows the prevailing strategy
of the traders. The results are rather encouraging because the method can indeed identify
these strategies. Finally we apply the method to real stock prices data of the NYSE and
the preliminary results show that it is possible to derive statistically significant information
on the prevailing trading strategy for a single day or larger time periods.
II. THE EFFECTIVE POTENTIAL MODEL
In recent papers [3, 4] has been introduced the idea the the stock-price dynamics can be
influenced by a moving average of the price itself in the previous time steps. Hence, at every
time step t, one can introduce a moving average of the previous M time steps:
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FIG. 1: Example of a model of price dynamics (in this case a simple RW) together with its moving
average defined as the average over the previous 50 points. The idea is that the distance of the
price from its moving average can lead to repulsive (blue arrows) or attractive (red arrows) effective
forces.
PM(t) =
1
M
M−1∑
τ=0
P (t− τ) (1)
In Fig. 1 is plotted the time evolution of a RW with Gaussian random noise together
with the moving average of the price.
One can investigate if there could be a relation between the next price increment P (t +
1)− P (t) and the difference P (t)− PM(t).
The simplest assumption is to adopt a linear dependence:
P (t+ 1)− P (t) ∝ P (t)− PM(t) (2)
In this case, the price dynamics can be described in terms of a RW with the existence of
a linear force. This force can be either repulsive or attractive depending on the sign of the
constant of proportionality between P (t+ 1)− P (t) and P (t)− PM(t).
Therefore, the dynamical equations of the price is a RW with the presence of a force that
is the gradient of a quadratic potential Φ [4].
P (t+ 1) = P (t)− b(t) d
dP (t)
Φ
(
P (t)− PM(t)
)
+ ω(t) (3)
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FIG. 2: Time evolution of the price described by Eq. 3. Three different behavior are plotted. The
red lines represents the time evolution of a RW in a repulsive quadratic potential while the blue
line is in an attractive quadratic potential. The green line is the case of flat potential (simple
RW). The parameters are fixed to M = 20 and b = ±1. We can observe an over diffusion (under
diffusion) in the case of repulsive (attractive) potential.
where ω(t) corresponds to a random noise with unitary variance and zero mean. PM(t)
is the moving average described in Eq. 1.
The potential Φ together with the pre-factor b(t) describe the interaction between the
price and the moving average. In simple assumption of a linear force [4], Φ results to be
quadratic:
φ
(
P (t)− PM(t)
)
=
(
P (t)− PM(t)
)2
. (4)
We can simulate a process whose dynamical stochastic equation is given by Eq. 3.
The time evolution of the “price” of such a process, is shown in Fig. 2, where we can
observe three cases in which the potential is attractive, repulsive and constant (simple RW).
From this simulation, one can reconstruct the force of the process plotting P (t+1)−P (t)
as a function of P (t)−PM(t). Then, integrating from the center, one can obtain the potential.
In Fig. 4 are shown the potential obtained from a simulation of the process described
in Eq. 3 in the case of attractive force for various values of M . We can observe that the
potentials have an amplitude (that is the slope of the linear force) which depends on M . In
[4] is shown that such a dependence can be eliminated rescaling the potential by a factor
(M − 1).
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FIG. 3: The plot shows the shapes of the quadratic attractive potentials defined by Eqs. 3 and 4.
We can see that the amplitude of the potentials depend on the choice of the parameter M .
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FIG. 4: The different potential plotted in Fig. 3 are re-plotted scaling the potential with the factor
(M − 1). We can see that in this way we obtain a good data collapse.
In Fig. 4 are shown the potentials plotted in Fig. 3, rescaled by the factor (M−1). Indeed
we can observe a good data collapse.
This idea of assuming a linear force in Eq. 3 has been tested on real data. In [4] a series
of data from the Yen-Dollar exchange rates have been analyzed. The potential analysis for
the case of the Yen-Dollar exchange rates indeed leads to the observation of rather quadratic
potentials.
Anyhow, other kind of force can be considered. For example one can suppose that the
price dynamic could depend only on the sign of the difference P (t)−PM(t). In this case an
5
interesting model is represented by the following dynamic for a RW with only up and down
steps [3].
{
p(↑) = 1/2 + ǫ1 for P (t)− PM(t) > 0
p(↓) = 1/2− ǫ1
(5)
{
p(↑) = 1/2− ǫ2 for P (t)− PM(t) < 0
p(↓) = 1/2 + ǫ2 .
(6)
This model implies a tendency of destabilization (or stabilization) depending on the signs
of ǫ1 and ǫ2.
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FIG. 5: In figure (a) is plotted the time evolution the price whose dynamics is described by Eqs. 5
and 6, compared with the time evolution of a simple RW. In figure (b) is plotted the shape of the
potential obtained analyzing the data plotted in (a). We can see a piecewise linear shape because
the relative model depends only on the sign of the difference P (t) − PM (t). The slope of the two
lines of the potential depends on the parameters ǫ1 and ǫ2.
The potential analysis for this case leads to a piecewise linear potential in which the
slopes are related to ǫ1 and ǫ2. The potential will be asymmetric if ǫ1 6= ǫ2. In Fig. 5(a) and
5(b) are shown the time evolutions of a price whose dynamical equations is given by Eqs. 5
and 6 in the case of asymmetric repulsive potential, and the relative shape of the potential.
In order to test this model, we have considered an agent based model and we have
performed the potential dynamics on the time series of the theoretical price that comes from
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the simulations. In the next section we are going to describe the specific rules of the agent
based model we have considered.
III. APPLICATION AND TEST ON AN AGENT BASED MODEL
It is instructive to analyze the effective potential scenario in agent-based models, where
the price process is not defined explicitly but only through the aggregate choices of a group
of traders. The simplest and most studied framework from a statistical physics perspective
is that of Minority Games [6, 7], in which each of N agents must decide at every (discrete)
time step whether to buy (ai(t) = 1) or sell (ai(t) = −1) an asset. The resulting price process
is determined by the decisions of all agents through the “excess demand” A(t) =
∑
N
i=1
ai(t).
In particular, neglecting liquidity effects for the sake of simplicity, one can write that
P (t+ 1)− P (t) = A(t), (7)
which amounts to defining the (log-)price as P (t) =
∑
t′<t
A(t′).
It is clear that an agent’s trading behavior will depend on his expectations about the
future price increment A(t), denoted by Ei[A(t)]. For example, it has been argued [8] that
if
Ei[A(t)] = ψiA(t− 1) + (1− ψi)A(t− 2), (8)
agent i behaves as a trend-follower for ψi > 1 (correspondingly he perceives the market
as a Majority Game with payoff πi(t) = ai(t)A(t)), while he behaves as a fundamentalist for
0 < ψi < 1 and plays a Minority Game with payoff πi(t) = −ai(t)A(t).
Let us now consider an agent who forms expectations according to (2). It is easy to see
that such an agent is described by a generalization of (8). Indeed, a direct calculation shows
that (2) corresponds to
Ei[A(t)] ∝
M−1∑
τ=1
M − τ
M
A(t− τ). (9)
Agents thus tend to discount events further back in time and give larger weight to re-
cent price changes when estimating the future returns. Clearly, such an agent has a more
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complicated reaction pattern than a pure Minority or Majority Game player and will be
described by a payoff function that accounts for the possibility of behaving differently in
different market regimes.
Models of this type have been introduced recently and appear to be an ideal testing
ground to verify the emergence of the effective potential scenario in a microscopic setting.
Specifically, we have tested it on a model in which agents may switch from a trend-following
to a fundamentalist attitude (and vice-versa) depending on the market conditions they
perceive, which was introduced in Ref. [5]. We refer the reader to the literature for a
detailed account of the model’s definition and properties. In a nutshell, it describes agents
who strive to maximize the payoff
πi(t) = ai(t)[A(t)− ǫA(t)3], (10)
where A(t) = A(t)/
√
N is the normalized excess demand. The idea is that for small price
movements (A(t) ≃ 0) agents perceive the game as a Majority Game as they try to identify
profitable trends. However when price movements become too large, the game is perceived
as a Minority Game, i.e. agents expect the price to revert to its fundamental value. As in
most Minority Games, agents have fixed schemes (‘strategies’) to react to the receipt of one
of P possible external information patterns and learn from experience to select the strategy
and, in turn, the action ai(t) that is more likely to deliver a positive payoff. A realistic
dynamical phenomenology is obtained in a whole range of values of the model parameter ǫ
when the number N of players is large compared to the amount of information available to
them P (this is measured by a parameter α = P/N , see [5] for details).
In Fig. 6 is shown the time evolution of P (t) for a game with parameters α = 0.05 and
ǫ = 1. This choice of parameters corresponds to be in the range in which the competition
between trend followers and contrarians is stronger. In fact, in Fig. 6, we can observe some
“ordered” periods, where A(t) is small and well defined trends in the price dynamics appear,
but also “chaotic” periods where the dynamics of the price is dominated by the contrarians.
In Fig. 6 we have identified two periods in which the different behaviors of the agents are
well defined and we have used these periods as dataset for our potential analysis.
In Fig. 7 are plotted the potentials obtained performing the effective potential analysis
withM = 20. We can observe that, when the market is dominated by contrarians, we obtain
an attractive potential. This shape of the potential reproduce the agents’ tendency to keep
8
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FIG. 6: The time evolution of P (t) for a minority-majority game with ǫ = 1 and α = 0.05 is
shown. We can observe the alternation of different regimes. In the graph are indicated two periods
by means of arrows. In the minority regime the price remains near to its fundamental value, while
in the majority regime appears a well defined trend.
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FIG. 7: The potential analysis with M = 20 for the two periods indicated in Fig. 6 is shown. The
analysis for the minority region leads to an attractive (even though not really quadratic) potential.
Instead, analyzing the majority region we found a repulsive potential.
the price near its “fundamental” value. We can also note that this potential is not perfectly
quadratic as in model described in Eqs. 3 and 4. In fact, plotting different potentials with
various values of M we can not obtain a data collapse scaling the potentials with the factor
(M−1). In case of market dominated by trend followers, we can observe the presence of well
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defined trends (bubbles and crashes). In this case the agents try to follow the trends and
the price tends to go away from his fundamental value. In this case we obtain a repulsive
potential.
Therefore, the potential analysis is able to detect the agents’ behavior based on micro-
scopic rules only analyzing the data of a macroscopic variable, P (t).
From the viewpoint of modeling real markets, it will be very interesting to introduce
an agent based model in which agents perform their decision (buy/sell) by considering
their expectations about the next price increment using Eq. 9, with different constant of
proportionality and different values of the ’memory’ M and not on the basis of a set of
given strategies (as in the minority game framework). Work along these lines is currently in
progress.
IV. RESULTS FOR REAL STOCK PRICES FROM NYSE
(a) (b) (c)
FIG. 8: The time evolution of three stock index (CLF, ITU and TOL) is shown. The time is
expressed in tick and correspond to one trading day.
For our potential analysis we consider as database the price time series of all the trans-
actions of a selection of 20 NYSE stocks. These have been selected to be representative and
with intermediate volatility. This corresponds to volumes of 105− 106 stocks exchanged per
day. We consider 80 days from October 2004 to February 2005.
The time series we consider are by a sequential order tick by tick. This is not identical to
the price value as a function of physical time but we have tested that the results are rather
insensitive to this choice.
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FIG. 9: The effective potential method has been applied to the price evolution of the three stocks
plotted in Fig. 8. We can see that the effective potential are rather asymmetric and not all
quadratic. The potential in (a) seems quadratic and attractive in the central part but has asym-
metric tails. The potential in (b) and (c) are not quadratic. In particular the potential in b is
asymmetric and looks like piecewise linear as in Fig. 5(b). The potential in (c) is flat like a simple
RW potential.
The statistical properties of these kind of data are relatively homogeneous within the time
scale of a trading day but the large jumps of the prices between different days prevent the
extension of the analysis to large times [9]. So we focus our potential analysis considering
the stock-prices fluctuations within a trading day. In Fig. 8 are plotted the time evolutions
of three stock indexes in a trading day.
If we perform the effective potential method for a trading day of a given stock, we found
shapes of the effective potential that are very irregular and often asymmetric. In Fig 9 are
plotted the results obtained for the data plotted in Fig 8. We can see that the shapes of
the potentials are not always quadratic. The potential in Fig. 9(a) it seems rather quadratic
and attractive while in Fig. 9(b) has a piecewise linear shape similar to the potential plotted
in Fig. 5(b). The potential in Fig 9(c) seems flat as one expects from a simple RW model.
Instead, if we consider some average over a long period (80 trading days) of the potentials
obtained for a single day, the resulting potentials seems to be quadratic as in [4]. In Fig. 10
are shown the average shape of the potential for two stock indexes (BRO and PG). We can
observe a rather quadratic shape for the potential. In Fig. 10(a) the potential is quadratic
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FIG. 10: This plot shows the average shape of the potential over 80 trading days for two different
stock indexes (BRO and PG). The shape is quite quadratic and symmetric, and in (a) is repulsive
while in (b) attractive.
and repulsive while for the index PG the potential is attractive, as we can see in Fig. 10(b).
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